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New Jersey's Office of Administrative Law:
The Importance of Initial Choices
By Jeff S. Masin*
In 1978, the New Jersey Legislature enacted and Governor
Brendan T. Byrne signed legislation establishing the New Jersey
Office of Administrative Law (OAL). 1  The passage of this
legislation came thirty years after the first legislative attempt to
separate the administrative hearing process, and those who
administered it, from the agencies that in many instances prosecuted
and in all cases had the ultimate authority to decide these
administrative contests. 2 The OAL officially opened for business on
July 2, 1979, when the first group of forty-one judges was sworn in
by Governor Byrne. 3  Over the past twenty-three years the OAL,
* As of the time of this writing, the author, first appointed an administrative
law judge (AU) in 1979, serves as Acting Director and Chief Administrative Law
Judge of the New Jersey Office of Administrative Law (OAL). The views
expressed herein are those of the author and are not meant to reflect any official
position of the OAL or the State of New Jersey. The author gratefully
acknowledges the assistance of Hon. Solomon A. Metzger, ALJ, Patricia Prunty,
Esq., and Susan Baldwin in the preparation of this article.
1. Act of July 6, 1978, ch. 67, 1978 N.J. Laws 374 (codified as N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 52:14 F-I (West 2003).
2. An attempt to establish an independent corps of hearing officers had been
proposed as early as 1948, following the adoption of New Jersey's new
Constitution in 1947. However, that attempt failed, as noted in Justice Nathan
Jacobs' dissent in the seminal case of Mazza v. Cavicchia, 105 A.2d 545, 566 (N.J.
1954).
3. Governor Byrne was a former superior court judge, former president of the
Board of Public Utilities and former Essex County Prosecutor. As one who had sat
at the head of executive branch agencies and in the judiciary, Governor Byrne
brought a unique perspective to the issue of an independent, highly professional
corps of administrative judges. In New Jersey's constitutional framework with its
"strong" governor who appoints all cabinet officers, his support for the concept,
both with the legislature and within the executive branch, was vital to the success
of both the legislation and the office itself.
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tasked not only to conduct contested case hearings, but also to
supervise the rulemaking process and to publish the Administrative
Code,4 has grown from a new agency initially viewed by many with
suspicion and concern into a well-recognized, respected and vital part
of the New Jersey justice system. This article will consider the
structure of the OAL and those elements that I believe have
contributed to its success and its recognized position as a national
model for "central hearing panels." 5  At the same time it will
recognize that there are factors in the New Jersey structure that are, if
4. The legislation establishing the OAL also transferred to the new agency the
duties and responsibilities of the existing Division of Administrative Procedure,
then a part of the Department of State. The director of the OAL was empowered to
"[a]ssist agencies in the preparation, consideration, publication and interpretation
of administrative rules required or appropriate pursuant to the 'Administrative
Procedure Act,"' N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:14 F-4.2i (West 2003). The OAL is the
official publisher of the New Jersey Administrative Code and the New Jersey
Register. While this article focuses upon the OAL's role in executive branch
administrative adjudication, the Rules and Publications section of the OAL has
brought to the process of rulemaking an extraordinary professionalism and
expertise. The additional responsibility for the Administrative Code is reflected in
the agency's designation as the "Office of Administrative Law," as opposed to the
more common name "Office of Administrative Hearings," which is generally used
in other states to designate those offices whose function encompasses only the
administrative hearing process.
5. The term "central hearing panel," often shortened in practice to "central
panel," generally signifies an agency detailed to conduct administrative hearings
for a number of transmitting agencies. It is an agency that is in some fashion made
independent of the agencies for which it hears cases, at least in regard to the
appointment processes for its judges and the independence of the judges from the
influence of the transmitting agencies over the decisions the judges render. The
number of transmitting agencies for which the central panel hears cases varies
greatly from panel to panel, but the concept of a "central" panel seems to imply that
the cases come from more than one agency of the state. The opposite of a central
panel is generally a hearing process in which the hearer, by whatever title
designated, is employed by the agency for which he or she conducts the hearings.
In such cases, the hearer generally does not hear cases for other agencies, although
there are variations in which an in-house hearing unit may be asked by another
agency to hear some cases for it. When established, New Jersey's OAL became the
eighth central panel in the United States, following California (1945), Missouri
(1965), Massachusetts (1974), Florida (1974), Minnesota (1975), Tennessee
(1975), and Colorado (1976). Today there are twenty-three states with some form
of central panel, in addition to those established in New York City, Chicago and
Washington, D.C.
not entirely unique, at least quite different from the other models for
central hearing panels
The major purpose of the legislation creating the New Jersey Office
of Administrative Law was "to bring impartiality and objectivity to
agency hearings and ultimately to achieve higher levels of fairness in
administrative adjudications." 6 The legislature "intended to create a
corps of independent professionals, who were not simply hearing
officers under a different title, but had greatly expanded duties."7 As a
first step in developing the proper atmosphere in which the OAL could
carry forward this mandate, the legislation establishing the OAL placed
the agency "in but not of' the Department of State.8 New Jersey's
Constitution requires that all state agencies must be allocated to one of
the authorized cabinet agencies, 9 but the legislation provided that
despite the allocation to the Department of State, "the office shall be
independent of any supervision or control by the department or by any
personnel thereof."' 10 Throughout its existence, the OAL has operated
free from control or interference by any state agency or personnel in its
administrative and adjudicative functions, except for budgetary
purposes, the Department of Treasury, and for general personnel
policies, the Department of Personnel. In addition, the director reports
to the governor (more practically, the governor's counsel) despite the
fact that the OAL is assigned to a cabinet officer that heads the agency.
The statutory language recognizing the full independence of the OAL
from agency control despite its allocation to an agency, has been an
invaluable asset in assuring that the agency's lack of standing as a
separate, cabinet-level agency has not hampered its ability to maintain
the necessary distance from even the agency to which it is assigned. 1
6. Unemployed-Employed Council of N.J., Inc. v. Horn, 428 A.2d 1305, 1307
(N.J. 1981).
7. N.J. Civil Serv. Ass'n v. N.J., 443 A.2d 1070, 1076 (N.J. 1982).
8. "In but not of' status also applies to various entities such as the Office of
the Public Defender (Department of the Treasury) and the New Jersey Commerce
and Economic Growth Commission (Department of the Treasury).
9. N.J. CONST. art. V, § 4, I.
10. N.J. STAT.ANN. § 52:14F-1 (West 2003).
11. Since the original legislation passed, subsequent governmental
reorganizations have moved the OAL to the Department of the Treasury, but its
status as "in but not of' has not changed, and the move has had no material effect
upon the independence of the OAL from its host agency.
Fall 2003 New Jersey's Office of Administrative Law
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At the very beginning of its existence, the legislature established
the OAL's jurisdiction quite broadly. Rather than limiting the OAL's
authority to hear contested cases to only a few State agencies, the
legislature mandated OAL involvement in the contested cases arising
in nearly every State agency. It directed that ALJs conduct all
hearings unless the agency head exercised the statutory discretion to
personally conduct the hearing.12 The only significant exceptions to
this broad grant of jurisdiction were the State Board of Parole, the
Public Employment Relations Commission, the Division of Tax
Appeals, and the Division of Workers' Compensation. 13 In addition,
a significant court decision concerning the Division of
Unemployment Security resulted in the elimination of numerous
cases arising within that agency from the OAL's docket. 14 With few
exceptions, all agencies within the OAL's jurisdiction have, from the
12. N.J. STAT.ANN. § 52:14F-8(b) (West 2003). The agency head, whether a
single commissioner or a multi-headed agency, may personally hear any contested
case.
13. Id. § 52:14F-8(a) (West 2003). The Division of Workers' Compensation,
an arm of the Department of Labor, has its own staff of workers' compensation
judges. In a few central panel states such as Colorado and Minnesota, the workers'
compensation and administrative law judges are all housed within the same Office
of Administrative Hearings.
14. While the hearing of contested unemployment compensation cases would
fall within the ambit of OAL jurisdiction under the statute, the New Jersey
Supreme Court, voting 4-2, held in Unemployed-Employed Council of New Jersey,
Inc., 428 A.2d at 1312, that under the structure existing for unemployment appeals
the major adjudicatory bodies within the Division, the "appellate level" board of
review and the intermediate level appeal tribunals, "may be considered an 'agency
head' for the purposes of the [OAL] statute." Therefore, hearings before these
bodies were lawfully exempted from the OAL's jurisdiction. The Court noted that
"with respect to a few firmly established and highly specialized agencies, where
perhaps the problem of agency bias was not thought to be patent or excessive or
was outweighed by other considerations, the Legislature specifically excluded the
conduct of their hearings in contested cases from the coverage of the OAL." Id. at
1313. The dissent agreed with the majority that the board of review was the "head
of the agency," but disagreed regarding the appeal tribunals, which in practice
consisted of many different tribunals actually each consisting of a single examiner.
Id. at 1315. The dissent concluded that these panels could not be considered
agency heads, as their decisions were not actually a "complete adjudication of the
contested matters," as, if they were not appealed from within ten days, the decision
was then deemed a final decision of the board of review. Id. at 1316.
very beginning, chosen to send their contested cases to the OAL for
hearing rather than have the agency head hear the cases.
15
By providing for so broad a jurisdiction, the Legislature avoided
the need for the piecemeal accretion of jurisdiction over additional
agencies that have often been the experience of other central panels.
In many instances, these panels were originally established with very
circumscribed jurisdiction over the hearings of only a few agencies,
and were then required to negotiate jurisdiction with other agencies
which, in some instances sought voluntary inclusion within the
jurisdiction of the independent agency, or, in other instances, were
resistant to attempts to expand the impartial hearing agency's
jurisdiction to include their cases. These central panels have
sometimes sought executive or legislative assistance in mandating the
submission of other initially exempted agencies into the panel's
jurisdiction. The results of such attempts have been at best mixed.
The Legislature also determined that the ALJs would be
appointed to their positions through essentially the same appointment
process as that used for the members of the state's judiciary. Unlike
the vast majority of central panels formed before or since, the judges
of New Jersey's OAL would not be civil service appointees, nor
would the director of the OAL appoint them. 16 Instead, from the
15. Examples of those agencies not employing the OAL to conduct their
hearings are the Real Estate Commission and several small professional licensing
boards. The Casino Control Commission, a five-member board, utilized the OAL
for hundreds of cases between 1979 and 1994. In 1994 it determined, apparently
for administrative and budgetary reasons, to utilize its individual board members to
conduct contested case hearings, pursuant to the authorization contained at N.J.
STAT.ANN. § 52:14F-8(b) (West 2001). The individual commissioner hears the
case and then files a report with the full Commission, which issues the final
administrative decision. Since 1994, the Commission has asked the OAL to
conduct two hearings in which it had concerns about the possible appearance of a
conflict if it conducted the hearing itself. One involved an alleged card counter
who had filed a federal suit against the Commission; the second was an employee
discipline proceeding against the executive director of the Commission, an at-will
employee without civil service status.
16. There are several different procedures employed for the appointment of
ALJs to central hearing panels. In some states, the director of the agency is
appointed by the governor (in North Carolina, by the chief justice of the Supreme
Court) and the director then appoints the judges. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-752, 7A-753
(current through 2003). In other states, the judges are selected through a civil
service process. In South Carolina the judges are elected by the legislature. S.C.
Fall 2003 New Jersey's Office of Administrative Law
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first, the Governor would appoint the judges with the advice and
consent of the Senate.'7 This decision created a corps of judges who
were, therefore, clearly political appointees. The statute as initially
adopted provided that judges would be appointed for five-year
terms. 18  However, the legislation also contained a provision
regarding the powers of the director that played a vital role in the
establishment of the original corps of judges. The statute granted the
director the authority to appoint temporary, or "case-basis," judges
"as may be necessary during emergency or unusual situations for the
proper performance of the duties of the office."1 9 These temporary
judges were to have the same qualifications for appointment as those
required of permanent ALJs.2 °
Utilizing this provision, Governor Byrne determined to withhold
his nomination of judges during the first year of the OAL's operation.
Instead, he authorized the OAL's first director, Howard Kestin, to
appoint the judges under the Director's authority for one year.21
During that year, the judges were carefully evaluated by the Director
CODE ANN. § 1-23-5 10 (Law. Co-op 1995). In Missouri the governor appoints the
three judges, who are referred to as "commissioners." MO. ANN. STAT. § 621.015,
287.610 (West 2003).
17. N.J. STAT.ANN. § 52:14F-4 (West 2001).
18. Id.
19. N.J. STAT.ANN. § 52:14F-5(m) (West 2003).
20. Section 52:14F-5(1) originally required ALJs to be attorneys-at-law of
New Jersey or, if not attorneys, to be persons, "in the judgment of the Governor or
the director," "qualified in the field of administrative law, administrative hearings
and proceedings in subject matter relating to the hearing functions of a particular
agency." N.J. STAT.ANN. § 52:14F-5(l) (West 2001). The initial corps of judges
included several non-attorneys who had previously served in a capacity with either
the Department of Education or the Department of Public Welfare in which they
were intimately involved in the hearing and dispute resolution process. Several of
these non-attorneys obtained law degrees after commencing their service as ALJs
and were admitted to the New Jersey Bar. The last sitting non-attorney, an expert
in public assistance law who over the years expanded his scope of knowledge to
encompass special education, alcoholic beverage and other areas, retired in July
2002. In 1993 the statute was amended to require that all future newly appointed
ALJs be members of the Bar in New Jersey for a minimum of five years. Id.
21. While the legislation establishing the OAL initially termed its appointed
head the "director" subsequent legislation amended the title to "Director of the
Office of Administrative Law and Chief Administrative Law Judge." N.J.
STAT.ANN. § 52:14F-3 (West 2001).
and, as the year came to a close, Director Kestin recommended to the
Governor those judges whom he found had proven their capability to
perform at the high level he demanded. Governor Byrne then offered
to the Senate the five-year term nominations for the sitting judges
who had proven satisfactory to the Director, and declined to
nominate those whom the Director did not believe merited continued
service. Governor Byrne's strategy created the opportunity to
carefully select the first judges for this new, and still controversial
central hearing panel, with a minimum of the political involvement or
interference that might have attended such a mass appointment
process had he chosen to submit an entire slate of nominees at the
very beginning of the OAL's operations. This arrangement afforded
the Director the luxury of assuring that this first critical group of
appointees would constitute a solid corps of judges who were
demonstrably capable of handling the demanding position, while
ultimately maintaining the Senate's role in approving the
appointments. After the first year, the nominees were reviewed and
confirmed by the Senate. Thereafter, the appointment process for
subsequent new ALJs was amended, preserving the valuable one-
year evaluation opportunity, while simultaneously assuring that, in
the future, the Senate would review the prospective new judges
immediately, rather than after they had served. In 1981, the statute
was amended, providing that the new judge would be appointed with
the advice and consent of the Senate, to a one-year term. After being
evaluated during that one year, the new judge would be appointed for
a four-year term, if found to be performing at an acceptable level.23
Thereafter, additional terms for judges would be five years, again
through nomination by the Governor with the Senate's advice and
consent.
24
This last statement highlights the fact that the Legislature did not
grant to ALJs the possibility of achieving tenured status. Each ALJ
would therefore face reappointment every five years; although,
importantly, the statute did provide that a judge served "until the
22. N.J. STAT.ANN. § 52:14F-4 (West 2001).
23. Id.
24. Id.
New Jersey's Office of Administrative LawFall 2003
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appointment and qualification of the judge's successor." 25 This lack
of tenure protection remains the case to this day. It is fair to state that
tenure has lost favor in the legislature, despite the fact that it is
constitutionally mandated for judicial branch judges in New Jersey,
as at the federal level, and has been granted to teachers, workers'
compensation judges, school custodians, principals and school
superintendents, over the years. 26 Indeed, the possibility of achieving
a tenured status has been eliminated for school administrators.2 7 In
this climate, it seems unlikely that ALJs will have the opportunity to
become tenured. The policy considerations militating in favor of, or
against allowing tenured status for any government employee or
officer, whether a judge or otherwise, are beyond the scope of this
article.
The political nature of the appointment process and the absence
of any tenure could have caused the position of administrative law
judge to be treated as a political prize, with the judges'
reappointments contingent upon "political" considerations. Since the
adoption of the 1947 Constitution, the reappointment of New Jersey's
superior court judges after their initial seven-year term has been
almost exclusively a non-political event, with the merit of the
candidate as the guiding principle. In the case of ALJs, it must be
noted that the process did have an unsettling early episode that could
have been a harbinger of things to come. In early 1983, three judges
initially appointed in January, 1982 completed their one-year term
and were then denied reappointment for the four-year term. The
25. Id. This language differed from that governing the terms of judicial
branch judges, who serve an initial seven-year term and are then eligible for tenure
until age seventy if reappointed. N.J. CONST. art. VI. § 6, par. 3. However, their
initial terms last exactly seven years, and if not reappointed by that anniversary
date, they are no longer judges. Id. While this sometimes causes an emergency
session of the Legislature to reappoint a judge whose term is ending, the AU
language allows ALJs to continue serving until they are either reappointed or
replaced. In practice, the lack of urgency in dealing with ALJ reappointments has
sometimes resulted in delays in the nomination and/or confirmation of judges. The
practical impact of such delay has been to lengthen the service of judges.
26. Workers' compensation judges originally received tenure upon
appointment, but legislation passed in 1991 provided that they serve an initial
three-year term and then, if reappointed, they receive tenure. N.J. STAT. ANN. §
34:15-49 (West 2001).
27 Id. § 18A:17-20.5 (West 2001).
New Jersey's Office of Administrative Law
reasons behind their lack of reappointment, while never officially
stated, were commonly suspected of being simply political. Since
that time, for nearly twenty years and through dozens of
reappointments of judges of both political parties and by governors of
both parties, the process has been untainted by politics. For example,
the recent reappointment of eight registered Republicans, appointed
by the previous Republican governor, by the present Democratic
governor, is in keeping with the non-political process that has
seemingly been accepted as the OAL has matured and become a
recognized and respected element of the state government.
28
The director's selection of the first group of judges was not
completed without some controversy. Rather than limit his selections
to the existing hearing officers employed full or part time by
administrative agencies, Director Kestin, acting after receiving an
opinion from the Attorney General, drew the judge applicants from
the private and public sector. The applicant pool included: hearing
officers, deputies attorney generals, attorneys employed by the State
in executive agency management, solo practitioners, and partners and
associates in private practice. Some of the existing hearing officers
who were not selected sued, contending that they had entitlement to
an appointment under the terms of the act creating the OAL. In an
opinion that can be rightly seen as confirming the legislative intent to
liberate the administrative adjudication process and the new OAL
from the shackles of the former system, the Supreme Court of New
Jersey held that the provisions of the statute did not grant existing
hearing officers any "grandfather" status.29  The Governor was
therefore, free to appoint whomever he saw fit, so long as the
prospective judge met the statutory criteria of admission to the bar or
possessed a "particular expertise."
30
In a state where judicial branch judges are all appointed and none
are elected, the decision to make ALJs gubernatorial appointees
served to enhance their status from the start. Combined with the
broad grant of jurisdiction, the gubernatorial appointment of the
judges created a strong political base upon which the OAL could
28. In practice, the reappointment process begins with a confidential
recommendation from the director and chief administrative law judge to the
Governor's counsel.
29. New Jersey Civil Serv. Ass'n., 443 A.2d at 1075.
30. Id.
I II ?.flli
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build its place in government. It invested the Legislature with an
interest in the success of the agency. Of course, the political nature
of the appointments could, in its worst sense, have led to the OAL
serving as an office in which to place political "cronies" and "hacks"
as a favor to persons who would not normally achieve such a position
on their own merit. Fortunately, in the nearly twenty-five years it has
been in operation, the selection process has led to the appointment of
a dedicated and extremely talented group of judges. It is true that, in
most instances, the ability to become an AU is limited by a person's
ability to be noticed and actively considered by a local senator.
However, as with the vast majority of the judicial branch appointees
in this state, the political process has served the people admirably.
The one apparent negative consequence of the political nature of
the appointment process has been the delay that often occurs in
filling vacancies. Appointments to AU positions are very often
determined in conjunction with the selection of appointees to thejudiciary. As a result, the time for the Governor to settle on names
for AU nomination submissions has occasionally been quite
protracted. This delay often leaves the OAL shorthanded and, along
with periodic budgetary constraints, has often caused the OAL to
operate with thirty-five to forty judges, compared to its original
complement of forty-five judges. As the agency's docket has
evolved, the shortage of judges has resulted in lengthier delays in
processing cases, and a need to concentrate on cases with time
priorities established by state or federal mandates, at the expense of
other, perhaps equally important matters with no such mandated
priority.31
While the director's authority to appoint temporary judges has
been utilized to allow retired ALJs to continue to work on limited
dockets, the directors have generally refrained from appointing
private sector attorneys to temporarily supplement the efforts of the
31. For instance, legislation requires that lemon law cases be resolved within
twenty days of submission to the OAL; teacher tenure cases must be expedited,
with rigid discovery schedules and mandated starting dates; and federal mandates
require that public assistance and special education cases be expedited. Other
cases, such as disability pension appeals and employee disciplinary termination
appeals, have no specific time mandates.
permanently appointed judges.32 This reluctance has stemmed from a
belief that the use of part-time attorney judges who otherwise
practice law, or have other employment would be a retreat to the
previous system of part-time hearing officers. Additionally, it would
be a regression from the desire to avoid the potential conflicts and
appearances of conflicts that can arise when attorneys, and their law
firms, appear as litigators at the OAL in one case, and then shift into
the role of temporary judges for other cases. In other state systems,
the director would have the ability to appoint judges to permanently
fill all funded positions, presumably without the delay caused by the
political appointment process.
A perpetual concern of central panel directors and their judges
has been the salary structures and limits which have, in the estimation
of many directors, hindered their ability to attract many good
candidates for ALJ positions. Fortunately, ALJs in New Jersey have
been reasonably well compensated. While the level of salary and the
system for determining the salaries of individual judges has varied
over the years in 1999, the Legislature, acting upon the
recommendations of a distinguished committee appointed to
recommend salaries for senior executive and judicial positions
enacted a new salary provision. 33 For the first time, AU salaries
were tied to those of the judicial branch. In so doing, the legislature
also equalized the salary levels of ALJs vis-A-vis those of workers'
compensation judges.34 In the end, the salaries achieved reasonably
reflected both the economic reality of a northeastern state and,
importantly, the significant work performed by the judges and the
32. In addition to retired ALJs, the OAL has long relied on the services of two
temporary judges, one a retired attorney and the other an attorney who did not
otherwise practice, each of whom possessed substantial experience in the complex
field of public utility ratemaking. These appointments reflected a very specific
need to supplement the available expertise of the corps of judges to manage a
somewhat arcane docket. While the retired attorney continues to assist the office,
the other attorney is now a federal AU.
33. Positions considered included: the Governor, cabinet officers, judicial
branch judges, workers' compensation judges and administrative law judges, and
Casino Control commissioners.
34. Legislation enacted in late 1991 had established a salary scale for workers'
compensation judges tied to set percentages of the salaries provided for trial judges
of the superior court.
New Jersey's Office of Administrative LawFall 2003
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high level of responsibility inherent in the position.35 Compensation
provided to judges serving other central panels has not always
reflected this recognition. It is impossible to determine with any
certainty how this issue would be resolved were the judges not
political appointees. However, I believe that the fact that both ALJs
and workers' compensation judges are drawn from the pool of those
within the scope of consideration for appointment to the judiciary has
helped them secure salaries that are, in fact, fairly representative of
their significant level of responsibility for matters which are often of
great public concern. 36
While appointment to the judiciary will, for most, be preferable to
appointment to an executive branch "judicial" position, due to the
higher salary, better pension and the undoubted prestige attached to ajudiciary appointment, over time the appointment to an ALJ position
has developed into a highly acceptable alternative for those who for
want of enough open seats in a vicinage cannot yet secure an
appointment to the superior court. In addition, an AU position has
become a much sought after position for others whose interest in ajudgeship is not necessarily so tied to an interest in a judicial branch
position. Also, AU appointees have, in increasing frequency, been
tapped within a few years of their appointment for positions within
the judiciary. At this time a former director and chief AU sits on the
New Jersey Supreme Court. Both a former director and chief AU
and a former deputy director sit on the Appellate Division of
Superior Court and two former ALJs serve as assignment judges,
35. At present, all ALJs start at $105,750, which is 75% of the salary of a
superior court trial judge, and then progress through two additional steps to a salary
of $119,850, or 81% of a trial judge's salary. The assignment judges and the
deputy director each receive an additional $2,500; the director and chief AU
receive $125,490, 89% of a trial judge's salary.
36. As a result of legislation passed in December 2001, one remaining
difference between the benefits received by workers' compensation judges and
administrative law judges is that retiring workers' compensation judges are eligible
to receive as much as 75% of their salary in pension benefits if they have served
twenty years and reached the age of sixty. The percentage is the same as that
received by Superior Court and Supreme Court judges, who receive higher salaries.
An industry assessment pays for the costs of the workers' compensation system,
including the judges' pensions. While there appears to be a clear recognition that
similar legislation is merited for ALJs, the enactment of such legislation has been
understandably sidetracked by the current budget difficulties affecting New Jersey.
each in charge of the judiciary in a vicinage. Two other former ALJs
have served on the Federal Bankruptcy Court. The presence of well
over a dozen former ALJs at various levels of the judiciary has
provided the State, and indeed the federal judicial branch, with a
better understanding and acceptance of the work of ALJs and of the
administrative process itself.
On balance, while improvements might be made to the process
for selecting all judges in this state, I believe that the public has been
substantially well served by the selection process as it currently exists
in New Jersey.
In order to assure a high level of competence in ALJ
performance, and to provide public input concerning the judges'
performance, a 1981 amendment mandated that the director develop
and implement a program of judicial evaluation to aid the director in
the performance of his duties and assist in the making of
reappointments. 37  The mandate directed that judicial evaluation
focus upon competence, productivity and demeanor. 38 It required
that as a part of the evaluation process, comments be obtained from
selected litigants and attorneys who appeared before the judge. The
statute specifically provides that "[t]he methods used by the judge but
not the result arrived at by the judge in any case may be used in
evaluating a judge."39 This mandate, which was one of the earliest
statutory provisions requiring a comprehensive evaluation system for
ALJs, (or for that matter any judges) had been anticipated by the
OAL's earlier initiation of an extensive system of randomized
questionnaires soliciting the comments of randomly selected litigants,
attorneys and agencies regarding many characteristics of a judge's
performance. The anonymous nature of the process encourages
candor, and overall, the system has been quite successful. The
evaluation process allows the director to monitor and address
performance problems, while passing on suggestions for
improvement to judges, without violating confidences. Productivity
information is coupled with the questionnaires. Importantly, random
review of AU opinions is conducted by the director and deputy
director. Again, these reviews do not consider the outcome of the
37. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:14F-5(S) (West 2001).
38. Id.
39. Id.
Npw Ipr pv' Office of Administrative Law11 " fi t
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cases, but instead, the means through which the judge presents and
explains the case and his or her determination of the matter. The
information obtained through the evaluation process is used both as
an educational tool for improving performance and, as the statute
provides, to assist the director in respect to reappointment
recommendations that are presented to the Governor in advance of
the completion of a judge's term.4 °
The Legislature also granted the OAL's director substantial
authority to create a uniform system for administrative adjudication
throughout State government. The director was authorized to
"[d]evelop uniform standards, rules of evidence, and procedures,
including but not limited to standards for determining whether a
summary or plenary hearing should be held to regulate the conduct of
contested cases and the rendering of administrative adjudications"; 41
to "[p]romulgate and enforce such rules for the prompt
implementation and coordinated administration of the
'Administrative Procedure Act' . . . as may be required or
appropriate"; 42 and to "administer and supervise the procedures
relating to the conduct of contested cases and the making of
administrative adjudications. 43 This broad grant of authority formed
the basis for the adoption in 1980 of the Uniform Administrative
Procedure Rules, N.J.A. C. 1:1-1 et seq.4 4 These rules established the
procedural framework for administrative adjudication for all OAL
hearings. Even more broadly, the rules govern the procedures
applicable for hearings conducted by the agency head, and contested
40. At one time the judges' salaries were tied directly to the evaluation
process. The system involved a complex and detailed analysis of written decisions,
which were rated by a panel of peers on a numerical scale. The judges generally
believed that the system was geared to monetary concerns, and was not primarily
used as a means of education and training. A committee of judges studied the
process and issued a report to the director urging significant changes and a
reorientation of evaluation. These recommendations were generally accepted, and
evaluation then became a process for self-improvement and the monitoring of any
significant concerns with a judge's performance, rather than a factor in salary
determination. Of course, as noted above, the evaluations are a significant factor in
the reappointment process.
41. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:14F-5(e) (West 2003).
42. Id. § 52:14F-5(f).
43. Id. § 52:14F-5(g).
44. N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 1 §. 1: 1-1.1 (a) (2003).
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hearings held by the exempt agencies.45 The Uniform Rules have,
over time, been supplemented by a series of Special Rules, created to
deal with the unique needs of particular types of cases.46 These
Special Rules are formulated by both the OAL and the requesting
agency, and are promulgated in Title 1 of the Administrative Code,
rather than in the requesting agency's own title. To date, the OAL
has never sought to dictate the forms of pleadings applicable to the
vast variety of agency disputes that come before it, instead, deferring
to the agency's own rules. The OAL's control over the details of the
hearing process has regularized and standardized the practice of
administrative law for the agencies, the Bar and the general public.
The decision to authorize the OAL to adopt uniform rules has
avoided the common difficulty reported by other central panels of
procedural patterns varying from agency to agency. At the same
time, the Special Rules have allowed for necessary variations without
undoing the goal of uniformity and consistency.
A significant aspect of the Uniform Rules is the creation of a
uniform system for discovery in contested cases.47 While the rules
provide for all of the usual forms of discovery common to judicial
branch litigation, the use of depositions is restricted to those
situations where the parties voluntarily agree to depose witnesses or
where the party seeking to conduct a deposition over the opposition
of the other party is able to convince a judge that "good cause" exists
for the deposition.48 Clearly, the intent here was to strictly limit the
use of depositions, and thus, reduce costs of the discovery process.
In practice, depositions have historically not played a substantial part
in the discovery process in OAL proceedings. "Good cause" has
generally been interpreted narrowly, and it must be something more
45. Id.
46. Examples of the types of cases for which some Special Rules have been
adopted include Council on Affordable Housing, Special Education, School Ethics,
Family Development, Insurance and Unemployment Benefit and State Temporary
Disability cases. The number of such Special Rules varies by case type.
Generally, the "special" rules relate to unique discovery limitations or time frames
applicable to the cases, definitional matters, unusual time frames for decisions and
exceptions, or hearing and evidence matters that are unusual due to the nature of
the case, statute or regulation.
47. N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. I §. I-10.1-.6.
48. Id. §. 1-10.2(c).
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than the natural desire of litigators to find out what potential
witnesses for the adversary might say at a hearing. In most instances,
depositions have been allowed when witnesses may not be available
at the hearing, when experts are involved (and even then sparingly),
or when a case is very old or involves a particularly complex fact
pattern.
Over the years, the OAL has experienced a significant increase in
the volume of motions filed. At first, motions of any sort were
relatively rare, but through the years motions concerning discovery
issues and, most importantly, motions for summary decision, have
become a greater feature of OAL practice.4 9 While the number of
motions does not approach that seen in the judiciary, there is a need
to manage the time necessary to allow judges to consider and write
orders, particularly those for summary decision. These motions have
complicated the judges' already crowded schedule of hearings and
initial decision writing.
The nature of the caseload has also changed. At first, the docket
was heavy with public assistance, civil service, Casino Control
Commission and motor vehicle cases (the latter including implied
consent.) However, over time, the complexity of the cases presented
to the OAL has significantly increased. The number of public
assistance cases has decreased substantially as a result of welfare
reform and economic conditions. 50 Breathalyzer refusal cases were
moved to the state's municipal courts to be tried along with the
driving-under-the-influence cases already within those courts'jurisdictions. The Casino Control Commission, a multi-person
agency head, determined to hold its hearings in-house, with its
individual commissioners presiding.51 As these cases were being
subtracted from the agency's docket, other trends developed. A
massive increase in special education filings occurred in the 1990s,
introducing a class of often exceptionally complex and hard-fought
cases. Unlike other cases within the OAL's jurisdiction, the ALJs
issue the final administrative ruling in special education cases. These
49. Id. §. 1-12.1-12.7.
50. See e.g. New Jersey Administrative Law Decisions available at:
http://lawlibrary.rutgers.edu/oal/search.shtml (last modified May 3, 2002).
51. Supra note 15.
rulings are appealable only to the state or federal judiciary. 52 Civil
rights, educational funding, public utility ratemaking, environmental,
and professional board proceedings have also become more
complex. 3 The result of these trends has been to reduce the number
of short proceedings and increase the number of multi-day cases.
With the exception of special education decisions and arbitration
decisions in Spill Fund matters, all decisions of ALJs are initial
decisions that are subject to review by the agency head of the
transmitting agency.54  Nearly all interlocutory orders are similarly
52. N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 1 §. 1-18.1 (2002). The number of these cases
transmitted to the OAL after initial intake at the Office of Special Education
Programs (OSEP) rose from 250 in 1995 to 640 in 2001. Many additional matters
are resolved by mediation or by informal discussion at the OSEP without the need
to involve the OAL. The impact of the increase in special education cases has been
dramatic. The federal mandates regarding the disposition of these cases and the
limited ability to manage the cases prior to the onset of the hearings each have
added to the difficulty of scheduling these cases within the judges' otherwise
crowded dockets. In addition, although not mandated by federal or state law, the
OAL has accepted the challenge of offering emergency relief to parties where
warranted. N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 1 §. 6A-12.1 (2003). This opportunity to seek
such relief in the administrative realm, as opposed to seeking it in the judicial
branch, has been utilized by hundreds of parties in the past ten years. While there
is no doubt that the need to manage this unpredictable docket of emergency matters
has complicated the OAL's ability to function, it does provide a substantial service
to litigants and avoids funneling these education-related controversies to the
judiciary.
53. The New Jersey Supreme Court has on several occasions directed that the
OAL conduct hearings in a special class of cases that involve education funding for
poor urban school districts found unable to provide students with the
constitutionally mandated "thorough and efficient education." These cases are
known as "Abbott cases" after the series of landmark New Jersey Supreme Court
decisions beginning with Abbott v. Burke, 495 A.2d 376, 390 (N.J. 1985). These
cases have involved issues dealing with hundreds of millions of dollars relating to
educational and related programs affecting both preschool children and K-12
students. Id. at 381. Recently, the OAL has also held extensive hearings in a case
in which rural and suburban districts sought to prove that they also qualify for the
financial assistance previously ordered for the urban districts. In addition to these
matters, the OAL also conducts hearings for the Board of Public Utilities in quasi-
legislative public utility electric, gas, telephone, cable television and water rate
areas.
54. Initial attempts by the OAL to differentiate between substantive and
procedural decisions, and limit the right of transmitting agency heads to review so-
called "procedural" decisions, were rejected by the New Jersey Supreme Court in
In re Uniform Administrative Procedure Rules, 447 A.2d 151 (N.J. 1982).
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susceptible to agency head review, either at the time the interlocutory
decision is rendered or, in the agency head's discretion, at the time of
review of the initial decision. 55 ALJs generally must decide cases
within forty-five days of the close of the record, unless state or
federal mandates require a shorter time for decision.56 Agency heads
are, likewise, required make final decisions accept, reject, or modify
the AI's decision within forty-five days.57 If the agency heads fail
to do so, the AL decision becomes the final decision of the agency. 58
However, as case loads have increased, case complexity has grown.
Budgetary limits have reduced the number of agency review
personnel, and the number of ALJs has remained depressed. The
number of cases in which either the judge, or the agency, or both
have found it necessary to request an extension of the time for issuing
a decision has grown. Extensions for an additional forty-five days in
which to issue a final decision are allowable for "good cause
shown." 59 Second, or any subsequent forty-five day extensions are
allowable upon a showing of "extraordinary circumstances."60 Such
extensions require the signature of the agency head and the director
of the OAL. In addition, a recent Appellate Division decision stated
that "any extension ... shall be under the supervision of the Director
of the OAL."-61  In practice, such extensions are readily granted,
although the OAL director has, at times, advised an agency head that
no further requests for an extension would be issued in a given case
when a reasonable number of extensions have already been obtained.
However, the Court did agree that a small class of decisions on matters directly
affecting and vital to the management of the hearing process itself was properly
reserved for review by the director of the OAL and not for the transmitting agency
head. Id. at 160. These include issues involving the disqualification of an attorney
or non-attorney representative, the recusal of a judge, disputes over hearing
locations, sanctions for costs, expenses or fines, and pro hac vice admission. Id.
55. See In re Unif. Admin, Procedure Rules, 447 A.2d 151, 160 (N.J. 1982);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:14B-10(c) (West 2001).
56. Cf., supra note 25.
57. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:14B-10(c) (West 2001).
58. Id.
59. N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 1 § 1-18.8 (2003).
60. Id.
61. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:14B-10(c) (West 2001); N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 1 § 1-
18.8(t) (2003); Capone v. N.J. Racing Comm'n and Silverman v. N.J. Racing
Comm'n, 817 A.2d 995, 1003 (N.J. Supr. Ct. App. Div. 2003).
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Similar limitations are used in connection with judges' requests. In
only one instance has the OAL director refused to sign an agency
extension request, a refusal later upheld upon court challenge.
62
The statutory law concerning the authority of an agency head to
modify or reject the initial decision of an AU has recently been
changed to reflect what had, for years, been the appellate case law
standard. Case law has long recognized that the person who actually
hears witness testimony has a distinct advantage in determining
credibility over one who simply reviews a cold record.63 Thus,
substantial deference is accorded to the trial judge's determinations
as to the credibility of witnesses. 64  In codifying this deferential
standard in the Administrative Procedure Act, the Legislature
instructed agency heads that they may not reject the ALJ's findings
of fact concerning the credibility of lay witnesses, unless it is
determined from a review of the record that the ALJ's findings are
either unsupported by sufficient, competent, and credible evidence,
or the findings are arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable. 65  In
practice, many factual determinations regarding the events and
circumstances relevant to the outcome of a contested case are
determined upon the credibility of the witnesses. This standard
greatly limits the situations in which an agency head can overturn the
factual findings of the AU concerning both credibility and the
material facts of the case. In contrast, no deference is accorded by
62. Newman v. Ramapo Coll. of N.J., 793 A.2d 120, 125 (N.J. Super.Ct. App.
Div. 2002). While the specific facts in Newman supported the refusal of an
extension, the willingness of the OAL to acquiesce in agency requests for
extensions is in part a practical recognition of the need for ALJs themselves to
obtain extensions and in part a bow to the expressed reluctance of the appellate
courts to see an agency "deprived" of the opportunity to decide a contested case.
See King v. N.J. Racing Comm'n, 511 A.2d 615 (N.J. 1986).
63. Clowes v. Terminix Intern., Inc., 538 A.2d 794 (1988).
64. Id.
65. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:14B-10(c) (West 2003). The original bill containing
the limitation upon agency review of credibility determinations also limited the
agencies' ability to review the judge's determinations of fact. However, the
legislation as passed did not retain this restriction. For a discussion of legislative
provisions limiting agency review of specific aspects of AU decisions, see James
F. Flanagan, Redefining the Role of the State Administrative Law Judges: Central
Panels and Their Impact on State AL Authority and Standards of Agency Review,
54 ADMiN. L. REv. 1355, 1376-1382, 1411-1415 (Fall 2002).
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case law or statute to the credibility determinations of the AU
regarding the testimony of expert witnesses, or the findings and
conclusions concerning the meaning and interpretation or the
application of statutes and regulations. 66 However, whenever the
agency head determines to either reject or modify the AL's findings
of fact, conclusions of law or interpretations of agency policy, the
statute requires that the agency head "state clearly the reasons for
doing so. ' 67
At present, with the notable exception of special education
decisions and arbitration awards made under the Spill Fund, no
orders or decisions issued by ALJs are final, whether they be
interlocutory or initial decisions. 68  The legislature has neither
provided for mandatory final administrative decision by an AU for
the agency's contested cases, nor, as exists in some states, for
advance, voluntarily waiver of an agency's right to review AU
decisions in a single case, or in a class of cases. 69 This article will
not explore the issue of "final decision authority., 70
66. Flannagan, supra note 65, at 1367-69, 1397.
67. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:14B-10(c) (West 2003). "Inexcusable neglect" and
"gross indifference" to an agency's statutory responsibilities resulting in an
agency's failure to produce a timely decision explaining in detail its findings and
conclusions may lead to the AU's decision being "deemed adopted," even when
the agency did issue a timely notification that it rejected the AU's initial decision.
Capone, 817 A.2d at 1003.
68. In re Kallen, 455 A.2d 460 (N.J. 1983).
69. An agency may choose not to affirmatively act upon an ALJ's decision
and thereby allow it to become the agency's final decision. N.J. STAT. ANN. §
52:14B-10(c) (West 2003). This "inaction" has always occurred after the judge has
issued the decision and not as a result of any agency's pre-announced intention to
let the ALJ's decision be its final decision. In some other central panel states,
legislative action has allowed for finality of some, or, indeed, all ALI decisions. In
the most sweeping provision, the decisions of Louisiana's central panel are all final
administrative determinations and the agency is even forbidden to appeal a
decision. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 49:992(B)(2),(3) (West 2003). In Maryland, the
governing statute provides that an agency may delegate to the Office of
Administrative Hearings the authority to issue proposed or final findings of fact,
proposed or final conclusions of law, proposed or final findings of fact and
conclusions of law, or the final administrative decision of an agency in a contested
case. MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV'T. § 10-205(b) (2002 Supp.). Many agencies
have utilized this discretionary authority and authorized the Office of
Administrative Hearings to issue final decisions, some on a case-by-case basis and
others by regulation in the Code of Maryland Agency Regulations. In Minnesota,
Another significant statutory provision, enacted in 1993, provides
that the OAL may promulgate and enforce rules for reasonable
sanctions, including assessments of costs and attorney's fees which
may be imposed on a party, attorney or other representative of a party
"who, without just excuse, fails to comply with any procedural order
or with any standard or rule applying to a contested case."7 While
the Uniform Administrative Procedure Rules had long provided for
case-related sanctions for failure to comply with such orders and
rules,72 the signal element of the 1993 enactment was the additional
provision that allowed the agency to promulgate and enforce rules
that permitted the imposition of a "fine not to exceed $1,000.00 for
misconduct which obstructs or tends to obstruct the conduct of
contested cases."73 This provision, while not granting to ALJs the
contempt authority that New Jersey has been determined to be a
power exclusive to the judiciary74 has provided the OAL and its
judges with a necessary option in rare cases where an attorney or
by statute the Office of Administrative Hearings issues final decisions in matters
arising by complaints filed with the state's human rights agency, MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 363.071 (West 2003); in employee discipline appeals; in municipal boundary
disputes; and in revenue recapture cases. In other instances the legislature has
allowed agency heads to delegate final decision authority to ALJs.
70. Although early in the history of New Jersey's OAL the concept of final
decision authority was the subject of an unsuccessful legislative proposal (which
never was voted upon) that generated opposing articles written respectively by the
then Deputy Director of the OAL and the state's Attorney General, there has been
no serious, in-depth consideration of the issue since the early 1980s. Given the
subsequent action of some legislatures in both central panel and non-central panel
states that has provided for some degree of finality in at least some instances,
perhaps it is time for the issue to be explored anew in New Jersey. There are
interesting arguments on both sides of the question, which will not be detailed here.
For early commentary on the question see Steven L. Lefelt, A Search for Agency
Expertise in New Jersey, 110 NEW JERSEY LAW .JOURNAL 525 (1982) (affirmative);
and Irwin I. Kimmelman, The Appropriate Role of the Office of Administrative
Law, 111 NEW JERSEY LAW JOURNAL 157 (1983) (negative). A recent
controversial analysis of trends can be found in James F. Flanagan, Redefining the
Role of the State Administrative Law Judge: Central Panels and Their Impact on
State AL Authority and Standards of Agency Review, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 1355
(Fall 2002).
71. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:14F-5(t) (West 2003).
72. N.J. ADMIN. CODEtit. 1 § 1-14.4.
73. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:14F-5(t) (West 2003).
74. Hayes v. Gulli, 418 A.2d 295 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1980).
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party simply refuses to control himself or herself and materially
delays or obstructs the course of a hearing.75
Throughout its history, the OAL has sought to assure that it
operated pursuant to the highest standards of ethics and judicial
responsibility. From its earliest days, the OAL directed its judges to
look to the New Jersey Code of Judicial Conduct for guidance on
matters of propriety.76 However, in 1992 the agency codified its own
Code of Judicial Conduct for Administrative Law Judges, based upon
the Model Code of Judicial Conduct as adopted by the ABA on
August 7, 1990, and the aforementioned New Jersey Code.7 7 A
primary feature of the Code is the absolute ban on any political
activity by an AU. 78 Judges, who serve full time, are also barred
from the practice of law. 79 The Rules also provide for a process for
disciplining AUs, including preliminary review of matters involving
potentially serious discipline such as suspension or removal by a
panel of judges followed by a hearing process. While the ultimate
authority to impose discipline short of removal lies with the director
and chief AU, whose decision is presumably subject to judicial
review as the final decision of an administrative agency, removal of a
judge can only occur if the Governor so determines, following receipt
of a recommendation for removal from the director. 80 Non-judicial
employees of the Office must comply with a Code of Ethics as well.
CONCLUSION
New Jersey's Office of Administrative Law has developed a
stellar reputation for independent, fair and comprehensive
75. This provision has been invoked against attorneys on two occasions. As
one attorney did not bother to pay the sanction, the matter was referred to the
Attorney General, who filed an action in Superior Court to enforce the OAL order
as a final agency action. The court upheld the sanction and ordered the attorney to
pay.
76. RULES GOVERNING THE COURTS OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY, App. TO
PART 1 (2001).
77. N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 1 § 1, APp. A (2003).
78. RULES GOVERNING THE COURTS OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY, CANON 5
(2001).
79. Id. at Canon 4F.
80. N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 1 §§ 31-3.1 et seq. (2003).
adjudication of a vast array of administrative disputes involving the
State, its agencies, local governmental and educational entities, and
the regulated public. Despite initial misgivings, I believe it has
convinced executive branch agencies that it is not a threat to their
ability to carry out their legislative mandates, while at the same time
assuring that they and the public "cut square comers." The appellate
courts have long recognized that the records arising from OAL
litigation are generally of superior quality, and the Supreme Court
has found that the OAL can be trusted to contribute to its
management of significant matters of great public concern.
The choices made in each state regarding the manner in which
that state's central panel has been formed, have been substantially the
product of the particular legal and political culture existing in that
jurisdiction. To a great extent the OAL's success is directly traceable
to the wise choices made by the legislature and Governor of New
Jersey, who gave it its start. The establishment of a truly independent
agency without ties to a "host" agency with supervisory powers over
the OAL and its director, the broad jurisdiction granted to the OAL
from the very beginning, the agency's statutory mandate to produce
binding rules of procedure, the decision that its judges should be
appointed much as the judges of the state's highly respected judiciary
are, and the significant early support of the Supreme Court to assure
that the new agency was protected against any potentially negative
"grandfather" influence, were all crucial aspects of building the
institution. Each, in its own way, has contributed to an
organizational structure and position that has been recognized
nationally as perhaps the most well-established and "judicial" central
panel in the country. The New Jersey model is not one that has been
adopted in whole in any other state. Yet, there is little doubt that
others have looked to New Jersey to see how and why its OAL has
been so successful. As the OAL approaches a quarter century of
service to the citizens of New Jersey, it will strive to continue its
mission to effectively, efficiently and independently serve the state
and its citizens.
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